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Mr. Justice Brandeis and the  
Art of Judicial Dissent 
Melvin I. Urofsky* 
When the Supreme Court of the United States met for its first Terms, it 
followed the English pattern of the Justices delivering their opinions 
seriatim; that is, each Justice delivered his own opinion of the case, what the 
result should be, and the legal reasoning behind it.1  This could sometimes 
be confusing, since the various opinions did not always agree on exactly 
what the result should be or why.  The first Chief Justice, John Jay, 
occasionally managed to get the Court to deliver a single majority opinion,2 
but when Oliver Ellsworth became Chief Justice in 1796, the Court had not 
developed a strong pattern regarding the use of either seriatim or majority 
opinions.3  In some cases, the use of seriatim opinions indicated differences 
of opinion among the Justices, but in others, there were multiple opinions 
even when there was unanimity on the bench.4  In the first opinion Ellsworth 
delivered, the case of La Vengeance,5 he delivered a consolidated majority 
opinion, from which Justice Samuel Chase dissented.6 
Ellsworth was “following the practice to which he had become 
accustomed when he served upon the Connecticut Superior Court from 1784 
to 1789.”7  Although a state statute called upon each judge to write an 
 
 *  A.B., Ph.D., Columbia University; J.D., University of Virginia.  Professor of Law and Public 
Policy, Virginia Commonwealth University.  This Article is in substance the annual Brandeis 
Lecture delivered at Pepperdine University School of Law on March 24, 2011.  The same caveat that 
applied to the lecture also holds true for this Article—it is a report on a work in progress, and is not 
meant to be a definitive statement about the nature of dissent on the Supreme Court. 
 1.  See Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, in 
SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 1, 20 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter SERIATIM]. 
 2.  See, e.g., Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794). 
 3.  See SERIATIM, supra note 1, at 20. 
 4.  Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795), and Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
171 (1796), were in essence unanimous, while in United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 
(1795), a majority opinion announced a split decision. 
 5.  United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796). 
 6.  WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 110 (1995). 
 7.  Id. 
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opinion in every case, the Connecticut Superior Court ignored the law, and 
adopted a practice of writing majority and occasional dissenting opinions, an 
approach that was surely more efficient in the expenditure of judicial labor.8  
After he became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Ellsworth established a pattern in which he would deliver short opinions of 
the Court, infrequently accompanied by a dissent.9  The practice of using 
majority rather than multiple opinions, initiated by Ellsworth, became 
consolidated during John Marshall’s long tenure, and while Marshall 
certainly cemented the practice, the credit should actually go to Ellsworth.10 
Marshall believed, as have his successors, that the force of the Court’s 
decision is greater on the public mind when it is delivered in one voice.  He 
explained: 
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the opinion 
which is to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is previously 
submitted to the consideration of all the judges; and, if any part of 
the reasoning be disapproved, it must be so modified as to receive 
the approbation of all, before it can be delivered as the opinion of 
all.11 
Marshall, it should be recalled, took his seat when the public viewed the 
judiciary as the least important part of the federal government, and the 
President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, made war upon it.12  It was 
housed in a basement below the Senate chamber because the Capitol 
architect had forgotten it in his plans.13  In its first decade, five members of 
the Court had resigned, and two others declined appointment after the Senate 
had confirmed them.14  Chief Justice John Jay resigned to become Governor 
of New York, and John Rutledge to become chief justice of the South 
Carolina Court of Common Pleas and Sessions.15 
But Marshall wanted not just to place the Judiciary on par with the 
Legislative and Executive Branches, he also wanted to create a jurisprudence 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 111. 
 10.  Id. at 110–12. 
 11.  John Marshall, A Friend to the Union, UNION (Phila.), Apr. 24, 1819, reprinted in JOHN 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 78, 80–81 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).  John 
Marshall wrote these essays in defense of the Court’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 12.  See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG 
REPUBLIC (1971); JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN 
MARSHALL, AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2002). 
 13.  SIMON, supra note 12, at 138. 
 14.  Donald G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 10 WM. & MARY Q. 353, 361 
n.24 (1953). 
 15.  Id.; see also SIMON, supra note 12, at 139. 
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for the Constitution that would endow the national government with powers 
strong enough to govern, and with policies to tie the nation together.16  In 
some ways, he hoped to fix for all time the basic meaning of the 
Constitution, although he understood that new situations in the future would 
demand new interpretations.17  “[W]e must never forget,” he declared, “that 
it is a constitution we are expounding,” one that the Framers had meant to 
last “for ages to come.”18  To do this, he believed the Court needed not only 
to expound proper doctrine, but to do so in a manner that would command 
public respect and obedience, and that required harmony and unity.19  And 
for the most part, he succeeded.  The great opinions that established our 
constitutional framework—Marbury v. Madison,20 Fletcher v. Peck,21 
McCulloch v. Maryland,22 the Dartmouth College Case,23 Cohens v. 
Virginia,24 and Gibbons v. Ogden25—are all the more powerful because they 
came from a united Court.  It is amazing to consider that from 1801 to 1823, 
no member of the Marshall Court, with the exception of William Johnson, 
spoke out in separate opinions, whether concurring or dissenting, in more 
than eight cases.26 
Not everyone was happy about this, especially John Marshall’s cousin 
and bitter enemy, Thomas Jefferson, who kept up a constant, but futile, 
crusade to get the Court to return to the practice of the English courts.  In 
English decisions, Jefferson declared, “[b]esides the light which their 
separate arguments threw on the subject, and the instruction communicated 
by their several modes of reasoning, it shewed [sic] whether the judges were 
unanimous or divided, and gave accordingly more or less weight to the 
judgment as a precedent.”27  The practice that Marshall had instituted, 
Jefferson charged in a letter to Justice William Johnson, is “certainly 
convenient for the lazy, the modest & the incompetent.  It saves them the 
 
 16.  Morgan, supra note 14, at 361. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819). 
 19.  Morgan, supra note 14, at 362. 
 20.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 21.  10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 22.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 
 23.  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 24.  19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 25.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 26.  Morgan, supra note 14, at 363. 
 27.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 12 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 246, 248 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905). 
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trouble of developing their opinion methodically and even of making up an 
opinion at all.”28 
Johnson, whom Jefferson had appointed to the Court in 1804,29 although 
receptive to the former President’s arguments, explained that he believed it 
unnecessary to write on every issue, especially those not involving 
constitutional issues, and until the 1920s, a vast majority of the Court’s 
agenda consisted of cases implicating neither federal power nor 
constitutional interpretation.30  But Johnson did begin to part company with 
Marshall,31 and his biographer has called him the “first dissenter.”32  
Between 1804 and 1822, Johnson delivered exactly half of the concurring 
and half of the dissenting opinions delivered by all the Justices,33 and both 
Marshall and his close associate, Justice Joseph Story, privately grumbled 
that Johnson had upset the harmony of the Court.34 
Today, Johnson, despite his three decades of service on the high Court, 
is barely remembered.  His dissents had no lasting impact, since they neither 
undermined the general judicial philosophy of Marshall, nor were they 
accepted as law by later courts.  In fact, prior to the Civil War, I would 
suggest that there were only two major Supreme Court dissents that 
mattered: those of Justices John McLean and Benjamin R. Curtis in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.35  Moreover, these dissents did not lead the Court to 
overrule Dred Scott; the Civil War and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did that.36 
About a year or so ago I posted a query on H-LAW,37 asking my fellow 
legal historians if they could think of any important dissent—important in 
that it led the Court to reverse an original ruling of consequence—prior to 
Justice Stephen Field’s dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases38 in 1873.  
They could not.  Thus, it is that dissent, I believe, that is the first modern 
 
 28.  Id. at 250. 
 29.  See DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 50–53 
(1954). 
 30.  PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 25 (1969). 
 31.  MORGAN, supra note 29, at 168–69, 290. 
 32.  Id. at v.  
 33.  Morgan, supra note 14, at 366. 
 34.  MORGAN, supra note 29, at 172–73. 
 35.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 529 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564 (Curtis, J., 
dissenting). 
 36.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 37.  See H-LAW, H-NET, http://www.h-net.org/~law/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).  H-LAW is a 
humanities social science online discussion network sponsored by the American Society for Legal 
History. 
 38.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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dissent; it not only contradicted the ruling and reasoning of the majority, but 
also set out the arguments that would ultimately be accepted as correct.39 
The Slaughter-House Cases, you will recall, tested whether a statute 
passed by the Reconstruction legislature in Louisiana, requiring all butchers 
in New Orleans to use a single abattoir for slaughtering livestock, violated 
the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.40  The majority opinion, by Justice Samuel Miller, dismissed 
these claims, holding that the law did not prevent anyone from plying their 
trade as a butcher, but was a simple health measure to protect the 
community.41  The Fourteenth Amendment, he declared, as everyone knew, 
had been adopted to guard the legal rights of the freed slaves, not to protect 
butchers or other businesses from legitimate state regulation.42  The Court, 
Miller argued, should not become a perpetual censor of state legislation nor 
the guarantor of individual rights.43 
Justice Stephen Field’s dissent would, in the end, be triumphant and 
dramatically affect the future course of American jurisprudence.44  He did 
not fear that the federal courts would become the censor of state action, and 
in fact welcomed such a development.45  Field argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected the basic rights of all Americans, not just the ex-
slaves, and this meant that the New Orleans butchers could not be denied 
their economic rights without due process of law.46  As Field noted, the issue 
was “nothing less than the question whether the recent amendments to the 
Federal Constitution protect the citizens of the United States against the 
 
 39.  Id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting).  While the actual holding of the case was never overturned, 
the jurisprudence of the majority view gave way to Field’s argument.  See CARL BRENT SWISHER, 
STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 424 (1930) (“[Field and his minority colleagues’] 
efforts were not in vain, however, for the Court gradually permitted new meaning to be read into the 
due process clause of the same amendment, and ultimately embodied in the constitutional law of the 
country much of the same material which Field had endeavored to introduce by way of the privileges 
and immunities clause.”). 
 40.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 36–39.  The best single book on the case 
and the issues it raised is RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: 
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003). 
 41.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57–83. 
 42.  Id. at 80–81. 
 43.  Id. at 78. 
 44.  Id. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 45.  Id. at 110. 
 46.  Id. at 95. 
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deprivation of their common rights by State legislation.”47  The Fourteenth 
Amendment, in his view, provided that protection.48 
In essence, Field argued that the Fourteenth Amendment had now 
created a new standard of rights—those enjoyed by citizens of the United 
States—and that these rights not only had to be respected by the states, but 
they could be enforced by federal courts.49  This idea took a while to catch 
on, but eventually, through the process of incorporation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court did apply most of the 
provisions in the Bill of Rights to the states.50  More importantly, Field’s 
exegesis of what due process of law meant, and that it included substantive 
economic rights, also won over the Court.51  By 1897, the notion of 
substantive due process—incorporating economic liberty and standing as a 
bar against regulation of property or the labor force—had become enshrined 
in the law,52 and would remain there until the great constitutional crisis of 
the 1930s. 
Field’s opinion is not normally included in what some scholars have 
called the “canon” of great dissents because it did not lead to the reversal of 
the original case.53  In their view, the first of the great canonical dissents is 
that of Justice John Marshall Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which he 
argued that laws segregating people on the basis of race were “inconsistent 
not only with that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National 
and State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the 
United States.”54  The Constitution, he declared, is “color-blind.”55  
Although it took almost six decades, eventually Harlan’s view won out when 
the Supreme Court in 1954 struck down racial segregation in Brown v. 
Board of Education.56  In fact, Harlan’s dissent still rings strongly, and has 
been cited in recent Court cases.57 
 
 47.  Id. at 89. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 110–11. 
 50.  See id. at 110. 
 51.  Id. at 83–111. 
 52.  See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590–93 (1897) (holding that a Louisiana statute 
affecting an individual’s “liberty” to contract violated the Constitution). 
 53.  See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 
244 (1998) (identifying “canon” cases like Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Brown 
v. Board of Education, which appear in “every major constitutional law casebook now on the 
market”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 
781, 781 (2000) (seeking to explain the methods by which various dissenting opinions became 
canonized and highlighting such dissents as Lochner v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson). 
 54.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 55.  Id. at 559. 
 56.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 57.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  Note 
that in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), both Justice Kennedy for the majority, id. at 623, and 
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But I would suggest that Field’s dissent is equally important.  It is true 
that it did not lead to a reversal of the Slaughter-House Cases, as Harlan’s 
helped lead to a reversal of Plessy.  Rather it deserves our attention because 
it started a constitutional dialogue over the meaning of key Fourteenth 
Amendment clauses, a process that took years and which, in many ways, is 
still not finished. 
This dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution has been going on 
since 1787, as has the debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists.  It is 
a dialogue not only among the members of the Court, but between them and 
the other branches of government and, to a large extent, between the Court 
and the people of the United States.  In this constitutional dialogue, dissent 
plays a critical role. 
The constitutional dialogue is necessary for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is that it is one of the ways in which we as a people reinvent 
and reinvigorate our democratic society.58  But it is also necessary because 
so much of the Constitution is general rather than specific.  “Originalists” 
believe that the Framers spelled out the true meaning of the Constitution for 
all time and that this meaning can be found by close examination of the 
document’s clauses, the minutes of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, and 
contemporary documents, such as The Federalist Papers.59 
It is true that some provisions of the Constitution are very precise.  
Members of the House of Representatives must be twenty-five years old and 
serve a two-year term;60 senators must be thirty and serve for six years;61 
presidents must be thirty-five, born in the United States, and serve for four 
years.62  The provisions for nominating and confirming judges,63 as well as 
for ratifying treaties,64 are also clear.  There are a number of other 
administrative arrangements that mean precisely what they say, such as a 
two-thirds vote in each house to override a presidential veto.65 
The important clauses, however, are far from precise.  Judges shall serve 
during “good Behaviour.”66  The President is “Commander in Chief.”67  
 
Justice Scalia in dissent, id. at 650, appealed to the Harlan dissent, offering differing views of what it 
meant, but agreeing on its authoritativeness. 
 58.  See DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTION 5–6 (2012). 
 59.  See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 243 (2009). 
 60.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cls. 1–2. 
 61.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 1, 3. 
 62.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 1, 4. 
 63.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 64.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 65.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 66.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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Congress shall make no law “respecting an establishment of religion.”68  
Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States.”69  No state shall deny to its citizens 
“due process of law.”70  A president may be impeached for “high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.”71  These are the clauses that grant power to the government 
and create rights for citizens, and there has been a debate over the 
interpretation of these enabling and rights clauses almost from the time 
George Washington took the oath of office as the first president.72 
Since that time, the country has grown across the continent and beyond, 
it has been industrialized and urbanized, riven by a civil war, and faced the 
challenges of new technology, such as railroads, automobiles, telephones, 
and now the Internet—none of which is addressed in the Constitution.  
During these years, the Court has had to interpret the Constitution in terms 
of the problems currently confronting the nation.  Indeed, James Madison, 
the “father of the Constitution,” declared that future generations had to read 
and apply the various clauses according to their own circumstances.73 
What the “correct” reading is at any given time is rarely clear, and here 
the Supreme Court has played a critical role in saying what the Constitution 
means.  But that does not mean that the majority of the Justices are always 
right.  The dissenters, by positing alternative interpretations, initiate the 
dialogue over what a particular provision should mean.  I am not arguing 
that whenever there is a dissent it is right; many dissents are wrong.  But the 
dialogue is critical.  Sometimes the matter is resolved quickly; in some cases 
it will take decades before the Court adjusts its position.74  Often we get a 
form of Hegelian dialogue, with two positions in one case (thesis and 
antithesis) leading to a compromise in a new case (synthesis), which in turn 
triggers a dissent. 
The cases that reach the Supreme Court are rarely easy; those get 
decided in the district courts and the courts of appeals.  If a case is accepted 
for review in the high Court, at least four Justices must believe that it 
 
 67.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 68.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 69.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 70.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 71.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 72.  See, e.g., Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877) (nineteenth century case 
noting discrepancies in definition of “due process” between states and the federal government). 
 73.  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447, 447–48 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966); see also Paul 
Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 
U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 367 (1989). 
 74.  Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) (“separate but equal” doctrine overruled fifty-eight years later), with McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (limited rights 
for corporations in election process overruled seven years later). 
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presents a constitutional question of large importance.75  The majority 
opinion in such a case establishes what the law is for the near future.  The 
dissent lays down markers that determine the ongoing discussion. 
This dialogue takes place at several levels and with different groups.  
Most immediately, it is a conversation among the members of the Court.  If 
there is disagreement in a case, the Justice assigned to write the majority 
opinion must not only take care to frame it so as to retain the votes of those 
supporting that outcome, but also take into account arguments raised in 
dissent, and, if possible, answer them.  On this subject, let me quote from a 
current member of the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: 
On the utility of dissenting opinions, I will mention first their 
in-house impact.  My experience teaches that there is nothing better 
than an impressive dissent to lead the author of the majority opinion 
to refine and clarify her initial circulation.  An illustration: The 
Virginia Military Institute case,76 decided by the Court in 1996, held 
that VMI’s denial of admission to women violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  I was assigned to write the 
Court’s opinion.  The final draft, released to the public, was ever so 
much better than my first, second, and at least a dozen more drafts, 
thanks to Justice Scalia’s attention-grabbing dissent.77 
Sometimes a draft dissent proves so compelling that it wins over 
previous opponents to provide what Justice William Brennan called the 
Court’s magic number—five.78 
(Although my subject this evening is dissent on the Supreme Court, I 
would be remiss if I did not note that dissenting opinions in the federal 
circuit courts of appeal and on state supreme courts often carry great weight, 
and, even if failing to win a majority below, may convince the high Court of 
their correctness.79) 
 
 75.  See Erwin N. Griswold, Rationing Justice—The Supreme Court’s Caseload and What the 
Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 345–46 (1975) (“[A]t least four Justices must vote to 
take the case before it will be heard.”). 
 76.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 77.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Dissent is an ‘Appeal’ for the Future, ALASKA B. RAG, Apr.–June 
2008, at 1, 6. 
 78.  Laura Krugman Ray, Judging the Justices: A Supreme Court Performance Review, 76 TEMP. 
L. REV. 209, 209 (2003). 
 79.  See, for example, the dissent in the Virginia Supreme Court by Justice Leroy R. Hassell Sr., 
in the cross-burning case, Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 748 (Va. 2001), which was 
partially reversed in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
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The dialogue also encompasses Congress and the Executive Branch.80  
Especially when the Court is engaged in statutory construction of federal 
statutes, a majority may find that the wording in the law should be 
interpreted one way, while the dissenters would read it differently.  Since 
this is not a question of constitutional restraint, the dissent will often suggest 
that if Congress had indeed meant the results to be different, then all it 
needed to do was revise the law. 
Perhaps the most striking example of this is a dissent by Justice Joseph 
Story in the little-known 1845 case of Cary v. Curtis,81 regarding a federal 
statute governing how courts reviewed appeals from importers of decisions 
on import duties imposed by the Collector of Custom.82  A revision of the 
law inadvertently left out a key provision, thus depriving importers of the 
same level of judicial review they had traditionally enjoyed.83  The majority 
said, in effect, Congress deleted this procedure, so it did not exist anymore.84  
Justice Story, in his dissent, said Congress could not have meant to upset the 
customary practice, and invited the legislators to remedy the situation.85  
Congress did so in thirty-six days, so rapidly in fact, that the revised law was 
on the statute books before the volume of that Term’s opinions could even 
be printed.86 
In 1986, the Court heard a case brought by Dr. Simcha Goldman, an 
Orthodox Jew challenging an Air Force regulation that prevented him from 
wearing a kippah, the traditional skullcap, while in uniform.87  Five members 
of the Court deferred to the military, claiming that Congress had delegated to 
the military the power to establish rules regarding uniform, and in the 
absence of any law holding otherwise, would defer to the military’s 
judgment regarding the need for uniformity in military attire.88  The 
dissenters chided the Court for its uncritical deference to the military, and 
for its somewhat extreme arguments that a small skullcap would somehow 
undermine military discipline.89  Shortly after the decision, Congress passed 
 
 80.  Although numerous cases could be cited regarding the Executive Branch, one in particular 
stands out, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 81.  44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 252 (1845) (Story, J., dissenting). 
 82.  Id. at 237–38 (majority opinion). 
 83.  See id. at 242–43. 
 84.  Id. at 244. 
 85.  Id. at 257 (Story, J., dissenting). 
 86.  George Stewart Brown, A Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Story Enacted as Law Within 
Thirty-Six Days, 26 VA. L. REV. 759, 760 (1940). 
 87.  Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986). 
 88.  Id. at 509–10. 
 89.  Id. at 515, 517–18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 526–27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 
531–32 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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legislation allowing Orthodox Jews to wear a kippah underneath official 
headgear.90 
The Court at all times is conversing with the American people,91 and, 
especially in controversial areas, dissents carry great weight.  One reason 
that Chief Justice Warren worked so hard to get unity in Brown v. Board of 
Education92 is that he understood that anything less than unanimity would 
undermine the moral force of the decision in segregated areas of the 
country.93  Certainly, the dissents in Dred Scott,94 as well as the Income Tax 
Cases,95 generated a public outcry that eventually led to the passage of 
constitutional amendments.96 
Over the course of our history, dissenters have been both liberal and 
conservative, rights protective and rights restrictive.  This is what makes the 
constitutional dialogue effective.  Dissent is not something that only liberals 
or defenders of the Bill of Rights do.  All Justices will enter dissents, some 
more frequently than others, and some with greater effect on the dialogue. 
One of the things that I tried to show in my Brandeis biography97 is how 
important he believed this dialogue to be.  Brandeis often dissented without 
opinion, because he did not believe the matter to be worth the great effort he 
poured into his written dissents.98  He was even willing to suppress a dissent, 
and there is a whole volume of extensive dissents Brandeis wrote and then 
withdrew, usually because the majority had adopted at least part of his 
position.99  Brandeis was trying to persuade not just the other members of 
the Court, but lawyers and law teachers.  He welcomed law review articles 
that criticized Supreme Court opinions, even his, because he thought it 
important that the constitutional dialogue take place not just among the nine 
Justices, but between the different branches of the federal government, 
 
 90.  See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988). 
 91.  This theme is creatively explored in BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 92.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 93.  See Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Earl Warren: Super Chief in Action, 33 TULSA L.J. 
477, 483–87 (1997). 
 94.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 95.  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 
(1895). 
 96.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XVI. 
 97.  MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE (2009). 
 98.  Id. at 579–81. 
 99.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT WORK (1957). 
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between the national government and the states, in the academy, and among 
citizens.100 
As I also noted in my Brandeis biography,101 dissents did not sit well 
with Chief Justice William Howard Taft.  “I don’t approve of dissents 
generally,” Taft wrote, “for I think that in many cases, where I differ from 
the majority, it is more important to stand by the Court and give its judgment 
weight.”102  Most dissents, he thought, “are a form of egotism.”103  Similarly, 
Justice Pierce Butler saw dissents as vain, and would have preferred to do 
away with them.104  As Chief Justice, Taft worked hard to build consensus, 
and was even willing to modify his own opinions to gain support from the 
others.  Over his eight-and-a-half years on the Court, Taft dissented only 
seventeen times, wrote only three dissenting opinions, and suppressed nearly 
200 of his own dissenting votes.105 
Brandeis distinguished cases involving constitutional questions from 
those involving common legal matters.106  “In ordinary cases there is a good 
deal to be said for not having dissents.  You want certainty & definiteness & 
it doesn’t matter terribly how you decide, so long as it is settled.”107  It is 
usually more important, he declared, “that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”108 
Brandeis also weighed the effect of dissents on relations with the other 
Justices.  “There is a limit to the frequency with which you can [dissent], 
without exasperating men.”109  He told Frankfurter that silence did not mean 
concurrence, but that one had to husband resources, and dissenting too often 
would weaken the force of an important dissent.110  He said “I sometimes 
endorse an opinion with which I do not agree, ‘I acquiesce’; as Holmes puts 
 
 100.  UROFSKY, supra note 97, at 609–10. 
 101.  Id. at 579–80. 
 102.  Letter from William Howard Taft to John H. Clarke (Feb. 10, 1922), in Robert Post, The 
Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking 
in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1310–11 (2001). 
 103.  Id. at 1311. 
 104.  Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 314.  
The most extreme view was that of the lawyer Frederick S. Tyler, who said that not even the votes of 
the Court should be announced, only the results.  Frederick S. Tyler, Letter to the Editor, Vanity of 
Dissenting Opinions, 9 A.B.A. J. 398, 398 (1923). 
 105.  Jonathan Lurie, Chief Justice Taft and Dissents: Down with the Brandeis Briefs!, 32 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 178, 181 (2007).  When Taft had been a U.S. Court of Appeals judge in the 1890s, he 
wrote 200 opinions for the court and entered only one dissent.  Id. 
 106.  UROFSKY, supra note 97, at 579. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  In 
Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U.S. 331 (1924), for example, Brandeis 
suppressed a dissent because “after all[,] it’s merely a question of statutory construction,” and, at his 
suggestion, the Chief Justice had removed the worst things.  Urofsky, supra note 104, at 329. 
 109.  UROFSKY, supra note 97, at 579. 
 110.  Id. 
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it ‘I’ll shut up.’”111  A dissenting Justice must take care to not “vent feelings 
or raise a rumpus.”112  “You may have a very important case of your own as 
to which you do not want to antagonize [other Justices] on a less important 
case.”113  For example, in a return of a Stone opinion, Brandeis wrote “I 
think this is woefully wrong, but do not expect to dissent.”114  And on a 
Holmes opinion he remarked that “I think the question was one for a jury—
but the case is of a class in which one may properly ‘shut up.’”115 
This strategy was effective because just as Brandeis acquiesced in 
others’ opinions, they concurred with him despite their doubts.116  Holmes 
wrote back on one return, “I am unconvinced.  I think the other 
interpretation more reasonable.”117  In the same case, McReynolds also 
disagreed, but “I shall not object.”118  Pierce Butler noted that he “inclined 
the other way,” but Brandeis had made a strong case, so “I am content—& 
concur.”119 
When aroused, however, and when he thought the matter important, 
Brandeis would enter a powerful dissent, laden not only with references to 
legal citations, but to economic and social materials as well.  After he and 
his clerk had labored over a dozen or more versions of a dissent, Brandeis 
would then say, “Now I think the opinion is persuasive, but what can we do 
to make it more instructive?”120  He understood that his brethren might not 
be persuaded, but he wanted to teach the facts of life to a wider audience, to 
get politicians, law professors, students, and others engaged in the dialogue. 
Some of Brandeis’s admirers wondered on occasion whether he overdid 
it.121  “[I]f you could hint to Brandeis,” Harold Laski wrote to Holmes, “that 
judicial opinions aren’t to be written in the form of a brief it would be a 
great relief to the world.  [Roscoe] Pound spoke rather strongly as to the 
 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id.; Post, supra note 102, at 1341. 
 115.  UROFSKY, supra note 97, at 579; Post, supra note 102, at 1341.  Post includes examples 
from nearly all the Justices, indicating that they shared this view of not dissenting except when it 
could not be helped.  Post, supra note 102, at 1341–44 nn.217–38. 
 116.  UROFSKY, supra note 97, at 579–80. 
 117.  Id. at 580. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id.  The first case was Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924), and the 
second is Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560 (1924).  The comments can be found in the case files in 
the Louis D. Brandeis Supreme Court Papers at Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 120.  Paul A. Freund, Justice Brandeis: A Law Clerk’s Remembrance, 68 AM. JEWISH HIST. 7, 11 
(1978). 
 121.  Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Teacher, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 733, 742 (2007). 
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advocate in B. being over-prominent in his decisions.”122  Holmes apparently 
agreed, but there was little he could do.123  The massive dissents, especially 
on economic matters and protective legislation, had a purpose.  State and 
federal legislatures had good reason to pass these laws, and judges should 
not allow their own views to override those of the people’s elected 
representatives.  Sometimes he did overdo it.  In explaining why Nebraska 
passed a statute regulating the size of a loaf of bread, Brandeis tells us more 
than we should ever want to know about the baking business.124 
As I have previously noted in the Brandeis Law Journal, if Brandeis, as 
part of his philosophy of judicial restraint, thought judges should defer to 
legislative wisdom in matters of economic regulation, he nonetheless 
believed courts had a more active role to play in the defense of civil 
liberties.125  When the Court heard a challenge to the 1918 Sedition Act, 
Brandeis joined Holmes in a unanimous opinion upholding the conviction of 
Charles Schenck, and accepted Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test.126  
Seven months later, he also joined Holmes, but this time in dissent, in the 
Abrams case.127  He later explained this shift when he told Felix Frankfurter 
“I have never been quite happy about my concurrence [in Schenck] . . . .  I 
had not then thought the issues of freedom of speech out—I thought at the 
subject, not through it.”128  Once he did think the matter through, Brandeis 
set out to educate his brethren, and in doing so, transformed the 
jurisprudence of the First Amendment’s Speech Clause. 
The elegance of Holmes’s Abrams opinion masked the fact that it gave 
little guidance to lower courts.  “Clear and present danger” is a very 
subjective test; to conservative jurists, any criticism of the status quo may 
appear clearly and presently dangerous.  As Brandeis noted, “[M]en may 
differ widely as to what loyalty to our country demands; and an intolerant 
majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may be prone in the future, as it has 
often been in the past, to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it 
disagrees.”129 
 
 122.  WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE 1910–
1921, at 168 (1999). 
 123.  Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Nov. 5, 1923), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 556–57 (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS]; Letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Nov. 21, 1924), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra, at 675. 
 124.  Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Urofsky, supra note 121, at 745–47. 
 126.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 127.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 128.  Urofsky, supra note 104, at 323–24. 
 129.  Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 495 (1920) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting). 
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Brandeis’s greatest contribution to free speech jurisprudence came in his 
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.130  While one may admire 
Brandeis’s opinions for their logic, their technical excellence, and their 
lucidity, in only a few instances did the prose rise to a level of elegance; in 
Whitney, Brandeis delivered as ringing a defense of liberty as anything the 
more quotable Holmes ever wrote: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the 
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its 
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.  They believed 
liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of 
liberty.  They believed that freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth . . . .131 
Where Holmes used the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, which is in 
essence a negative means of protecting speech, Brandeis suggested a 
positive reason for the Speech Clause.  The highest honor in a democracy is 
to be a citizen, but it carries the responsibility to participate in the governing 
process.  To make informed decisions on public matters, the citizenry had to 
have the information necessary to weigh all sides of an issue.  If the state 
silenced unpopular speakers, then it crippled the citizen in the performance 
of his or her responsibility.  Free speech is necessary not just as an 
individual right, but as the bedrock of democratic government.132 
In the dissents in free speech cases that Brandeis wrote between 1920 
and Whitney in 1927, he slowly worked out the arguments as to why speech 
had to be protected, and did so in such a manner as to instruct lower court 
judges, as well as the legal academy.  It would take four decades before the 
Supreme Court finally abolished the crime of sedition,133 but if we trace the 
opinions and dissents in the cases in those years, we can see the dialogue 
between Brandeis in Whitney and his successors on the Court, grappling 
with the issues he raised and finally accepting his argument in full. 
 
 130.  274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 131.  Id. at 375. 
 132.  The best explication of this opinion is Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of 
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 
(1988). 
 133.  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444. 
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The last issue I want to talk about is Brandeis and the right to privacy 
which I also explored in the aforementioned Brandeis Law Journal article.134  
Brandeis had been an advocate of privacy ever since the early days of his 
practice.135  He and Sam Warren had written a pioneering article on the 
subject,136 which Dean Roscoe Pound said did “nothing less than add a 
chapter to our law.”137  Although there may be no mention of the word in the 
Constitution, Brandeis believed that the “right to be let alone” constituted a 
basic right of the American people.138  He got the chance to explicate this 
view when the Court first confronted wire-tapping in Olmstead v. United 
States.139 
In investigating a prohibition ring, government agents tapped the 
suspects’ homes, and on the basis of some 775 pages of notes, secured a 
conviction under the National Prohibition Act.140  At the trial, the defendants 
had raised the constitutional issue that a search had been made without a 
warrant.141  On appeal, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a 5–4 majority, 
dismissed the Fourth Amendment argument.142  No actual intrusion had been 
made into the house, therefore no search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment had taken place.143  Holmes entered a short dissent, and the 
Brahmin in him came through in his characterization of wire-tapping as a 
“dirty business.”144  But he deferred to and joined in what he termed 
Brandeis’s “exhaustive” opinion.145 
Brandeis objected to the Court’s opinion on three grounds.  The Fourth 
Amendment did not just protect against actual invasion of one’s home; 
rather, the Framers had intended it to protect the sense of security one felt in 
one’s home, knowing that the government could not enter without a warrant 
issued under probable cause.146  To allow someone to eavesdrop may have 
met some fine technicality, but it violated the very spirit that the Fourth 
Amendment had been intended to provide.147 
 
 134.  Urofsky, supra note 121, at 747–49. 
 135.  Id. at 747. 
 136.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 137.  ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946). 
 138.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 139.  Id. at 471. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 455–57 (majority opinion). 
 142.  Id. at 466. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Justice Butler also entered a well-reasoned dissent that 
shredded the Chief Justice’s arguments.  Id. at 485–88 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
 145.  Id. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 146.  Id. at 474–75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 147.  Id. at 482. 
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Second, he objected—as did Holmes—to the government acting 
lawlessly in order to catch criminals.148  “Our Government,” he lectured the 
majority, “is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example. . . .  If the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law . . . .”149  Discussing the case, he told 
his niece Fannie that “[l]ying and sneaking are always bad, no matter what 
the ends . . . I don’t care about punishing crime, but I am implacable in 
maintaining standards.”150 
The bulk of his opinion, however, laid out his views on the meaning of 
privacy in a free society.  “The makers of our Constitution,” he declared, 
undertook “to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the Government, 
the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men.”151  This “right to be let alone,” because of its 
importance, had to be given the greatest protection, and any unauthorized 
intrusion into a person’s privacy “must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”152 
Brandeis worried that new inventions would make it ever easier for the 
government, unless restrained, to invade the sanctity of a home or office 
without actually entering the premises.153  In their law review article in 1890, 
Warren and Brandeis had warned about new inventions.  “[M]echanical 
devices,” they declared, “threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”154  Four 
decades later he warned:  
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means 
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.  Ways may 
some day be developed by which the Government, without 
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, 
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home.155 
 
 148.  Id. at 485. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 139 (1993). 
 151.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 152.  Id. at 478–79. 
 153.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 136, at 195–96. 
 154.  Id. at 195. 
 155.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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In his folders on Olmstead, Brandeis had a newspaper clipping about a new 
device called “television.”156  Brandeis, like most men of his time, believed 
in progress, but he did not consider all change for the good, and refused to 
use the telephone, which he condemned as an invasion of his privacy.157 
Taft, needless to say, was furious with this dissent.  “If they think we are 
going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a 
chance to punish criminals,” he told his brother, “they are mistaken, even 
though we are condemned for lack of high ideals.”158  He termed Brandeis 
the “lawless member of our Court,”159 and predicted that in the future people 
would see that “we in the majority were right.”160 
In fact, just the opposite would happen.  In his dissent, Brandeis did not 
just condemn the “dirty business” of wiretapping, he laid out very carefully 
why it should be condemned as a violation not only of the Fourth 
Amendment, but also of the right to privacy, which he believed the 
Constitution also protected.161  His arguments set the stage for a 
constitutional dialogue that would eventually embrace his views. 
Brandeis lived to see Congress prohibit wiretapping evidence in federal 
courts in the Communications Act of 1934,162 and for the Court to partially 
reverse Olmstead in 1937.163  In 1967, the Court fully adopted Brandeis’s 
position and overturned Olmstead completely, bringing wiretapping within 
the ambit of Fourth Amendment protection.164  That same year, Justice 
Potter Stewart explained the Court’s new philosophy in words that grew 
directly out of Brandeis’s dissent: “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”165  A few years earlier, in the landmark decision 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court embraced privacy as a constitutionally 
protected right.166 
There is so much more that can be said about dissent, but for that I am 
afraid you shall have to await the book upon which I am now working.  
 
 156.  NORMAN K. RISJORD, REPRESENTATIVE AMERICANS: POPULISTS AND PROGRESSIVES 192 
(2005). 
 157.  UROFSKY, supra note 97, at 716.  In this regard, see Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), which directly reflects the concerns about intrusive 
technology Brandeis raised more than seventy years earlier. 
 158.  ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 259 (1964). 
 159.  Id. at 227. 
 160.  Id. at 259; see also 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: 
A BIOGRAPHY 991 (1939). 
 161.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471–85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled 
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 162.  47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934). 
 163.  Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (Brandeis was in the 7–2 majority upholding 
the Communications Act provision that wiretapping without a warrant was illegal). 
 164.  Berger, 388 U.S. 41. 
 165.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 166.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Needless to say, Louis Brandeis shall play a prominent role in that book, 
since I believe that he understood not only the nature of the constitutional 
dialogue, but also the need for it.  Years earlier, during his campaign to 
establish savings bank life insurance in Massachusetts, Brandeis had written: 
“If we should get tomorrow the necessary legislation, without having 
achieved that process of education, we could not make a practical working 
success of the plan.”167  To change judicial habits, to look at the Constitution 
anew, also required education, and his dissents are models of how that 
process works.  He well realized, however, that education took time; one 
should not expect immediate results.  But, as he often said, “My faith in time 
is great.”168  Looking back, we can now see that time rewarded that faith. 
 
 167.  Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Henry Morgenthau, Sr. (Nov. 20, 1906), in 1 LETTERS OF 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 482, 483 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971). 
 168.  UROFSKY, supra note 97, at 756. 
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